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Description of the structural model
The goal of this Appendix is to describe the model used for simulations of productivity and
wage changes in different counterfactuals as part of SERC’s research for the Northern Way on
the impact of strengthening economic linkages between Leeds and Manchester. The model has
been developed by Behrens et al. (2008) to which the reader might refer for further details.
1 Closed economy
Consider a closed economy with a final consumption good, provided as a continuum of hori-
zontally differentiated varieties. We denote by Ω the endogenously determined set of available
varieties, with measure N . There are L consumers, each of whom supplies inelastically one unit
of labor, which is the only factor of production.
1.1 Preferences and demands
All consumers have identical preferences which display ‘love of variety’ and give rise to demands
with variable elasticities. Following Behrens and Murata (2007), the utility maximization prob-
lem of a representative consumer is given by:
max
q(j), j∈Ω
U ≡
∫
Ω
[
1− e−αq(j)]dj s.t. ∫
Ω
p(j)q(j)dj = E, (1)
where E denotes expenditure; p(j) > 0 and q(j) ≥ 0 stand for the price and the per capita
consumption of variety j; and α > 0 is a parameter. As shown by Behrens and Murata (2007),
solving (1) yields the following demand functions:
q(i) =
E
Np
− 1
α
{
ln
[
p(i)
Np
]
+ h
}
, ∀i ∈ Ω, (2)
where
p ≡ 1
N
∫
Ω
p(j)dj and h ≡ −
∫
Ω
ln
[
p(j)
Np
]
p(j)
Np
dj
denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution, respectively. Since
marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded, the demand for a variety need not be positive.
Indeed, as can be seen from (2), the demand for variety i is positive if and only if its price is
lower than the reservation price pd. Formally,
q(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ p(i) < pd ≡ Np eαENp−h. (3)
Note that the reservation price pd is a function of the price aggregates p and h. Combining
expressions (2) and (3) allows us to express the demand for variety i concisely as follows:
q(i) =
1
α
ln
[
pd
p(i)
]
. (4)
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1.2 Technology and market structure
The labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive so that all firms take the wage rate w
as given. Prior to production, each firm engages in research and development, which requires
a fixed amount F of labor paid at the market wage. Each firm discovers its marginal labor
requirement m(i) ≥ 0 only after making this irreversible investment. We assume that m(i) is
drawn from a common and known, continuously differentiable distribution G. Since research
and development costs are sunk, a firm will survive (i.e., remain active) in the market provided
it can charge a price p(i) above marginal cost m(i)w.
Each surviving firm sets its price to maximize operating profit
pi(i) = L
[
p(i)−m(i)w]q(i), (5)
where q(i) is given by (4). Since there is a continuum of firms, no individual firm has any impact
on pd so that the first-order conditions for (operating) profit maximization are given by:
ln
[
pd
p(i)
]
=
p(i)−m(i)w
p(i)
, ∀i ∈ Ω. (6)
A price distribution satisfying (6) is called a price equilibrium. Multiplying both sides of (6) by
p(i), integrating over Ω, and using (4) yield the average price as follows:
p = mw +
αE
N
, (7)
where m ≡ (1/N) ∫
Ω
m(j)dj denotes the average marginal labor requirement of the surviving
firms. Observe that expression (7) displays pro-competitive effects, i.e., the average price is
decreasing in the mass of surviving firms N .
Equations (4) and (6) imply that q(i) = (1/α)[1 − m(i)w/p(i)], which allows us to derive
the upper and lower bounds for the marginal labor requirement. The maximum output is given
by q(i) = 1/α at m(i) = 0. The minimum output is given by q(i) = 0 at p(i) = m(i)w, which
by (6) implies that p(i) = pd. Therefore, the cutoff marginal labor requirement is defined as
md ≡ pd/w. A firm that draws md is indifferent between producing and not producing, whereas
all firms with a draw below (resp., above) md remain in (resp., exit from) the market.
Since firms differ only by their marginal labor requirement, we can express all firm-level
variables in terms ofm. Solving (6) by using the LambertW function, defined as ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ),
the profit-maximizing prices and quantities, as well as operating profits, can be expressed as
follows:
p(m) =
mw
W
, q(m) =
1
α
(1−W ), pi(m) = Lmw
α
(
W−1 +W − 2) , (8)
where we suppress the argument em/md of W to alleviate notation. It is readily verified that
W ′ > 0 for all non-negative arguments and that W (0) = 0 and W (e) = 1 (see Section A.1 for the
derivation of (8) and the properties of W ). Hence, 0 ≤ W ≤ 1 if 0 ≤ m ≤ md. The expressions
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in (8) show that a firm with a draw md charges a price equal to marginal cost, faces zero demand,
and earns zero profit. Since W ′ > 0, we readily obtain ∂p(m)/∂m > 0, ∂q(m)/∂m < 0 and
∂pi(m)/∂m < 0. In words, firms with better draws charge lower prices, sell larger quantities,
and earn higher operating profits than firms with worse draws.
1.3 Equilibrium
We now state the equilibrium conditions for the closed economy, which consist of zero expected
profits and labor market clearing. First, given the mass of entrants NE, the mass of surviving
firms can be written as N = NEG(md). Using (5), the zero expected profit condition for each
firm is given by:
L
∫ md
0
[p(m)−mw] q(m)dG(m) = Fw, (9)
which, combined with (8), can be rewritten as
L
α
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2) dG(m) = F. (10)
As the left-hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in md from 0 to∞, there always exists a unique
equilibrium cutoff (see Section A.2). Furthermore, the labor market clearing condition is given
by:1
NE
[
L
∫ md
0
mq(m)dG(m) + F
]
= L, (11)
which, combined with (8), can be rewritten as
NE
[
L
α
∫ md
0
m (1−W ) dG(m) + F
]
= L. (12)
Given the equilibrium cutoff md, equation (12) can be uniquely solved for NE.
How does population size affect entry and firms’ survival probabilities? Using the equilibrium
conditions (10) and (12), we can show that a larger L leads to more entrants NE and a smaller
cutoff md, respectively (see Section A.3). The effect of population size on the mass of surviving
firms N is in general ambiguous. However, under the commonly made assumption that firms’
productivity draws 1/m follow a Pareto distribution
G(m) =
( m
mmax
)k
,
1Note that by using (9) and the budget constraint NE
∫md
0
p(m)q(m)dG(m) = E, we obtain EL/(wNE) =
L
∫md
0
mq(m)dG(m) + F which, together with (11), yields E = w in equilibrium.
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with upper bound mmax > 0 and shape parameter k ≥ 1, we can show that N is increasing in L.2
Using this distributional assumption, we readily obtain closed-form solutions for the equilibrium
cutoff and mass of entrants:
md =
[
αF (mmax)k
κ2L
] 1
k+1
and NE =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
L
F
,
where κ1 and κ2 are positive constants that solely depend on k (see Sections B.1 and B.2).
3 The
mass of surviving firms is then given as follows:
N =
κ
1
k+1
2
κ1 + κ2
( α
mmax
) k
k+1
(
L
F
) 1
k+1
,
which is increasing in population size L. One can further check that N is decreasing in the fixed
labor requirement F and in the upper bound mmax. Finally, since m = [k/(k+1)]md holds when
productivity follows a Pareto distribution, a larger population also maps into higher average
productivity 1/m.
2 Open economy
We now turn to the open economy case. As dealing with two regions only marginally alleviates
the notational burden, we first derive the equilibrium conditions for the general case with K
asymmetric regions that we use when taking our model to the data. We then present some
clear-cut analytical results for the special case of two asymmetric regions in order to guide the
intuition for the general case.
2.1 Preferences and demands
Preferences are analogous to the ones described in the previous section. Let psr(i) and qsr(i)
denote the price and the per capita consumption of variety i when it is produced in region s and
consumed in region r. It is readily verified that the demand functions in the open economy case
are given as follows:
qsr(i) =
Er
N crpr
− 1
α
{
ln
[
psr(i)
N crpr
]
+ hr
}
, ∀i ∈ Ωsr,
where N cr is the mass of varieties consumed in region r; Ωsr denotes the set of varieties produced
in region s and consumed in region r; and
pr ≡
1
N cr
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)dj and hr ≡ −
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
ln
[
psr(j)
N crpr
]
psr(j)
N crpr
dj
2The Pareto distribution has been extensively used in the previous literature on heterogeneous firms (e.g.,
Bernard et al., 2007; Helpman et al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
3For this solution to be consistent, we must ensure that md ≤ mmax, i.e., mmax ≥ αF/(κ2L).
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denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution of all varieties
consumed in region r. As in the closed economy case, the demand for domestic variety i (resp.,
foreign variety j) is positive if and only if the price of variety i (resp., variety j) is lower than
the reservation price pdr . Formally,
qrr(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ prr(i) < pdr and qsr(j) > 0 ⇐⇒ psr(j) < pdr ,
where pdr ≡ N crpreαEr/(Ncrpr)−hr is a function of the price aggregates pr and hr. The demands for
domestic and foreign varieties can then be concisely expressed as follows:
qrr(i) =
1
α
ln
[
pdr
prr(i)
]
and qsr(j) =
1
α
ln
[
pdr
psr(j)
]
. (13)
2.2 Technology and market structure
Technology and the entry process are identical to the ones described in Section 2. We assume
that shipments from r to s are subject to trade costs τrs > 1 for all r and s, that markets are
segmented, and that firms are free to price discriminate.
Firms in region r independently draw their productivities from a region-specific distribution
Gr. Assuming that firms incur trade costs in terms of labor, the operating profit of firm i in r
is given by:
pir(i) =
∑
s
pirs(i) =
∑
s
Lsqrs(i) [prs(i)− τrsmr(i)wr] . (14)
Each firm maximizes (14) with respect to its prices prs(i) separately. Since it has no impact on
the price aggregates and on the wages, the first-order conditions are given by:
ln
[
pds
prs(i)
]
=
prs(i)− τrsmr(i)wr
prs(i)
, ∀i ∈ Ωrs. (15)
We first solve for the average price in region r. To do so, multiply (15) by prs(i), use (13),
integrate over Ωrs, and finally sum the resulting expressions to obtain
pr ≡
1
N cr
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)dj =
1
N cr
∑
s
τsrws
∫
Ωsr
ms(j)dj +
αEr
N cr
, (16)
where the first term is the average of marginal delivered costs in region r. Expression (16) shows
that pr is decreasing in the mass N
c
r of firms competing in region r, which is similar to the result
on pro-competitive effects established in the closed economy case.
Equations (13) and (15) imply that qrs(i) = (1/α)[1 − τrsmr(i)wr/prs(i)], which shows that
qrs(i) = 0 at prs(i) = τrsmr(i)wr. It then follows from (15) that prs(i) = p
d
s. Hence, a firm
located in r with draw mxrs ≡ pds/(τrswr) is just indifferent between selling and not selling in
region s. All firms with draws below mxrs are productive enough to sell to region s. In what
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follows, we refer to mxss ≡ mds as the domestic cutoff in region s, whereas mxrs with r 6= s is the
export cutoff. Export and domestic cutoffs are linked as follows:
mxrs =
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds. (17)
Expression (17) reveals how trade costs and wage differentials affect firms’ ability to break into
foreign markets. When wages are equalized (wr = ws) and internal trade is costless (τss = 1),
all export cutoffs must fall short of the domestic cutoffs since τrs > 1. In that case, breaking
into any foreign market is always harder than selling domestically. However, in the presence of
wage differentials and internal trade costs, the domestic and the foreign cutoffs can no longer
be clearly ranked. The usual ranking, namely that exporting to s is more difficult than selling
domestically in s, prevails only when τssws < τrswr.
The first-order conditions (15) can be solved as in the closed economy case. Switching to
notation in terms of m, the profit-maximizing prices and quantities, as well as operating profits,
are given by:
prs(m) =
τrsmwr
W
, qrs(m) =
1
α
(1−W ) , pirs = Lsτrsmwr
α
(W−1 +W − 2), (18)
where W denotes the Lambert W function with argument eτrsmwr/p
d
s, which we suppress to
alleviate notation. It is readily verified that more productive firms again charge lower prices,
sell larger quantities, and earn higher operating profits.
Observe that in an open economy, the masses of varieties consumed and produced in each
region need not be the same. Given a mass of entrants NEr , only N
p
r = N
E
r Gr (maxs {mxrs})
firms survive, namely those which are productive enough to sell at least in one market. Finally,
the mass of varieties consumed in region r is given by
N cr =
∑
s
NEs Gs(m
x
sr). (19)
2.3 Equilibrium
The zero expected profit condition for each firm in region r is given by
∑
s
Ls
∫ mxrs
0
[prs(m)− τrsmwr] qrs(m)dGr(m) = Frwr, (20)
where Fr is the region-specific fixed labor requirement. Furthermore, each labor market clears
in equilibrium, which requires that
NEr
[∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
mqrs(m)dGr(m) + Fr
]
= Lr. (21)
7
Last, trade is balanced for each region:
NEr
∑
s6=r
Ls
∫ mxrs
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m) = Lr
∑
s6=r
NEs
∫ mxsr
0
psr(m)qsr(m)dGs(m).
As in the foregoing section, we can restate the equilibrium conditions using the Lambert W
function (see Section C for details).
In what follows, we assume that productivity draws 1/m follow a Pareto distribution with
identical shape parameters k ≥ 1. However, to capture differences in local technological possi-
bilities, we allow the upper bounds to vary across regions, i.e., Gr(m) = (m/m
max
r )
k. A lower
mmaxr implies that firms in region r have a higher probability of drawing a better productivity.
Under the Pareto distribution, the equilibrium conditions can be greatly simplified. First, using
the expressions in Sections B.1 and C.1, labor market clearing requires that
NEr
[
κ1
α (mmaxr )
k
∑
s
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
+ Fr
]
= Lr. (22)
Second, using the expressions in Sections B.2 and C.2, zero expected profits imply that
µmaxr ≡
αFr (m
max
r )
k
κ2
=
∑
s
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
, (23)
where µr is a simple monotonic transformation of the upper bounds. Last, using the expressions
in Sections B.3 and C.3, balanced trade requires that
NEr wr
(mmaxr )
k
∑
s 6=r
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
= Lr
∑
s 6=r
τsr
NEs ws
(mmaxs )
k
(
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
mdr
)k+1
. (24)
The 3K conditions (22)–(24) depend on 3K unknowns: the wages wr, the masses of entrants
NEr , and the domestic cutoffs m
d
r . The export cutoffs m
x
rs can then be computed using (17).
Combining (22) and (23) immediately shows that
NEr =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
Lr
Fr
. (25)
The mass of entrants in region r therefore positively depends on that region’s size Lr and
negatively on its fixed labor requirement Fr.
Adding the term in r that is missing on both sides of (24), and using (23) and (25), we obtain
the following equilibrium relationship:
1
(mdr)
k+1
=
∑
s
Lsτrr
(
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
)k
1
µmaxs
. (26)
Expressions (23) and (26) summarize how wages, upper bounds, cutoffs, trade costs and popu-
lation sizes are related in general equilibrium.
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2.4 Two-region case
Our model allows for clear-cut comparative static results with two asymmetric regions. Us-
ing (23)–(25), an equilibrium can be characterized by a system of three equations with three
unknowns (the two cutoffs md1 and m
d
2, and the relative wage w1/w2) as follows:(
w1
w2
)2k+1
=
(
τ21
τ12
)k (
τ22
τ11
)k+1(
md2
md1
)k+1(
µmax2
µmax1
)
(27)
µmaxr = Lrτrr
(
mdr
)k+1
+ Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
, (28)
for r = 1, 2 and s 6= r. Equation (28) for regions 1 and 2 can readily be solved for the cutoffs as
a function of the relative wage ω ≡ w1/w2:
(md1)
k+1 =
µmax1
L1τ11
1− ρ
(
τ22
τ12
)k
ω−(k+1)
1−
(
τ11τ22
τ12τ21
)k and (md2)k+1 = µmax2L2τ22
1− ρ−1
(
τ11
τ21
)k
ωk+1
1−
(
τ22τ11
τ21τ12
)k , (29)
where ρ ≡ µmax2 /µmax1 captures relative technological possibilities. A larger ρ (given Fr) implies,
ceteris paribus, that firms in region 2 face a higher probability of drawing a worse productivity
than those in region 1. Substituting the cutoffs (29) into (27) yields after some simplification
LHS ≡ ωk = ρL1
L2
(
τ21
τ12
)k
ρτ−k11 − τ−k21 ωk+1
τ−k22 ωk+1 − ρτ−k12
≡ RHS. (30)
Assume that intraregional trade is less costly than interregional trade, i.e., τ11 < τ21 and τ22 < τ12.
Then, the RHS of (30) is decreasing in ω on its relevant domain, whereas the LHS is increasing
in ω. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium such that the equilibrium relative wage ω∗ is
bounded by relative trade costs τ22/τ12 and τ21/τ11, relative technological possibilities ρ, and the
shape parameter k (see Section A.4).
Since the RHS of (30) is decreasing in ω, the comparative static results are straightforward to
derive. Assume that τ21 = τ12 and τ11 = τ22. In Section A.5 we show that, everything else equal:
(i) the larger region has the higher wage; (ii) higher internal trade costs in one region reduce its
relative wage; (iii) better access for one region to the other raises its relative wage; (iv) wages
converge as bilateral trade barriers fall; (v) the larger region has the lower cutoff and the higher
utility; and (vi) the cutoff decreases and the utility increases as bilateral trade barriers fall.
2.5 Welfare
To see that tougher selection or more diversity in consumption map into welfare gains, notice
that since e−αqsr(m) = psr(m)/pdr by (13), the indirect utility in region r is given by
Ur =
∑
s
NEs
∫ mxsr
0
[
1− e−αqsr(m)] dGs(m) = N cr (1− prpdr
)
.
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Using expression (16), one can verify that pr = [k/(k + 1)]p
d
r + αwr/N
c
r , which allows us to
express the indirect utility as Ur = N
c
r/(k + 1)− α/(τrrmdr). Since N cr is defined as in (19), and
making use of the fact that expression (26) holds in equilibrium, we can rewrite the indirect
utility as follows:
Ur =
[
1
(k + 1)κ3
− 1
]
α
τrrmdr
. (31)
Hence, welfare is inversely proportional to the cutoff mdr . Alternatively, the equilibrium utility
can be written as Ur = [1/(k + 1)− κ3]N cr ., i.e., welfare changes in region r are proportional to
changes in the mass of varieties available for consumption.
3 Estimation and counterfactuals
In this section we take the model with K asymmetric regions to the data. To this end, we first
derive two sets of general equilibrium constraints. Using data on wages, GDP per worker, pop-
ulation, firms’ productivity dispersion, and generalized transport costs for UK local authorities
and city regions, we then structurally estimate trade frictions. With all the elements of the
model in our hands, we are finally able to simulate productivity and wage changes across UK
regions stemming from different policies.
3.1 Gravity equation system
The value of exports from region r to region s is given by
Xrs = N
E
r Ls
∫ mxsr
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m).
Using equations (18), (25), and the Pareto distribution for Gr(m), we obtain the following gravity
equation:4
Xrs
LrLs
= τ−krs τ
k+1
ss (ws/wr)
k+1wr
(
mds
)k+1
(µmaxr )
−1 . (32)
As can be seen from (32), exports depend on bilateral trade costs τrs, internal trade costs in the
destination τss, origin and destination wages wr and ws, destination productivity m
d
s, and origin
technological possibilities µmaxr . A higher relative wage ws/wr raises the value of exports as firms
in r face relatively lower production costs, whereas a higher absolute wage wr raises the value
of exports by increasing export prices prs. Furthermore, a larger m
d
s raises the value of exports
since firms located in the destination are on average less productive. Last, a lower µmaxr implies
4Contrary to standard practice in the gravity literature, we do not move the GDPs but instead move the
population sizes to the left-hand side. Applying the former approach to our model would amount to assuming
that wages are exogenous in the gravity estimation, which is not the case in general equilibrium.
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that firms in region r have higher expected productivity, which raises the value of their exports.
Conditions (23) and (26) allow us to derive the following general equilibrium constraints:
1
(mds)
k+1
=
∑
v
Lvτ
−k
vs τ
k+1
ss
(
ws
wv
)k
(µmaxv )
−1 s = 1, 2, . . . K (33)
µmaxr =
∑
v
Lvτ
−k
rv τ
k+1
vv
(
wv
wr
)k+1 (
mdv
)k+1
r = 1, 2. . . . K (34)
The gravity equation system consists of the gravity equation (32) and the 2K general equilibrium
constraints (33) and (34) that summarize the interactions between the 2K endogenous variables,
namely the wages and cutoffs.
3.2 Data and estimation procedure
To estimate the gravity equation system (32)–(34) like in Behrens et al. (2008) data on trade
flows across regions are needed. However, such data are not available for the UK. An alternative
strategy, that we adopt in what follows, is to use the 2K general equilibrium constraints (33)
and (34) only.
Looking at general equilibrium constrains, one can notice that some variables are easily
observable while others needs to be estimated. Data on wages wr and populations Lr across UK
regions are indeed easy to obtain and we borrow them from, respectively, the Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the Office for National Statistics (ONS). Data refers to the
year 2006. As for productivities mdr we use, in a fully consistent way with respect to the model,
local GDP per worker in 2006 reconstructed from NUTS3 GDP data provided by Eurostat
and total employment figures provided by ONS.5 Indeed, under the Pareto distribution, the
domestic cutoff in each region is proportional to the inverse of the average firm productivity, i.e.,
mdr = [(k + 1)/k]mr. Since labor is the only production input, a firm productivity in the model
corresponds to its value added per worker while the sum of firms’ value added equals local GDP.
Finally as a measure of the degree of firms’ heterogeneity in productivity, the parameter k, we
use the the rather standard value of 2.6
In order to close the model, we are still left with trade frictions (τrs) and technological possi-
bilities (µmaxr ). Trade frictions, in a broad sense, represents all impediments to doing business in
different locations. As standard in the gravity literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004)
we assume that such costs are related to distance. In particular, we assume τrs ≡ dγrs where drs
5Data on GDP at the local authority level are not available and have been reconstructed from NUTS3 data.
In a first step, NUTS3 GDP per worker has been regressed on local wages, employment density, and employment
density squared producing an R2 of 0.8092. Using the estimated coefficients of such a regressions, GDP at the
local authority level has been estimated from available data on wages, employment density, and employment
density squared referring to the same spatial scale.
6See Del Gatto et al. (2006).
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is the generalized transportation cost (GTC) between region r and s and γ is a parameter to be
estimated.7 GTC within a region is either directly available or, for missing observations, it has
been assumed to be half of the GTC between a region and its first order contiguity neighbors.
Technological possibilities µmaxr represents the competitiveness of a region once ‘discounted’
for its size, population, and accessibility to other regions. Clearly, data for such a variable do
not exist and need to be reconstructed from the model. In order to estimate µmaxr , as well as the
γ for all regions, we use the following iterative procedure:
1. We start with an initial guess for γ and use (34) to back out values for µmaxr . Let us denote
such values as µ̂maxr
2. Using µ̂maxr in (33) we estimate γ by non-linear lest squares to produce and estimate γˆ
3. Using γˆ in (34) we obtain new values for µ̂maxr .
4. Iterate steps 2 and 3 until convergence. Convergence is achieved whenever the value γˆ in
two consecutive iterations is lower than 10−6.
By applying such a procedure we obtain a significant (at the 5% confidence level) γˆ=-0.0366
with the R2 of the non-linear least squares estimation of (33) being 0.8049.
3.3 Counterfactual simulations
In order to simulate the impact of changes in trade costs and/or population on productivity and
wages we proceed as follows. We first compute the values of productivity 1/
(
mds
)
obtained after
the convergence of our iterative procedure using (33): ̂1/ (mds). These values of productivity are
then plugged into (34) in order to obtain consistent equilibrium values of wages ŵv/wr. Such
values of wages are then used in (33) to get another guess for productivity. We iterate such
procedure until both ̂1/ (mds) and ŵv/wr satisfy conditions (33) and (34)
In order to back out the impact of transport policies (defined as changes of some trade costs
values τrs) and/or housing policies (defined as changes of some values of local populations  Lr) we
solve for the new values of wages and GDP per worker that satisfy the 2K system of equations
(33) and (34). GDP per worker changes induced by a given policy can be fully recovered.
However, as the model is invariant with respect to the absolute level of wages (i.e. only relative
wages matters), regional wage changes induced by a given policy needs to be evaluated with
7In particular, we use the weighted average of road GTC and the train GTC. Weights are given by the share
of journeys of 5 miles and more made with (respectively) car and train. Such weights, provided by the 2006
National Travel Survey, are equal to 0.8684 and 0.1316. GTC road are based on the year 1998 while GTC train
are based on the year 2004. We use the change in the retail price index over the period 1998-2004 to make GTC
road comparable to GTC train. See Appendix 3 of the SERC report for details on sources and construction
methodology of GTC data.
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respect to a reference region. We choose the city-region of Aberdeen as ‘numeraire’ because
is rather small and peripheral with respect to the study area of Leeds and Manchester and is
therefore likely to be only marginally affected by the policies under evaluation. Such relative
wage changes are thus ‘quasi absolute wage changes’. Indeed, in all simulations, GDP per worker
changes in Aberdeen are negligible.
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A: Proofs and computations
A.1. Derivation of (8) and properties of W . Using pd = mdw, the first-order conditions
(6) can be rewritten as
ln
[
mdw
p(m)
]
= 1− mw
p(m)
.
Taking the exponential of both sides and rearranging terms, we have
e
m
md
=
mw
p(m)
e
mw
p(m) .
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Noting that the Lambert W function is defined as ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ) and setting ϕ = em/md, we
obtain W (em/md) = mw/p(m), which implies p(m) as given in (8). The derivations of q(m)
and pi(m) then follow straightforwardly.
Turning to the properties of the Lambert W function, we clearly see that ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ)
implies that W (ϕ) ≥ 0 for all ϕ ≥ 0. Taking logarithms on both sides and differentiating yield
W ′(ϕ) =
W (ϕ)
ϕ[W (ϕ) + 1]
> 0
for all ϕ > 0. Finally, we have 0 = W (0)eW (0), which implies W (0) = 0; and e = W (e)eW (e),
which implies W (e) = 1.
A.2. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoff md. We show that there exists
a unique equilibrium cutoff md. To see this, apply the Leibnitz integral rule to the left-hand
side of (10) and use W (e) = 1 to obtain
eL
α(md)2
∫ md
0
m2
(
W−2 − 1)W ′dG(m) > 0,
where the sign comes from W ′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Hence, the left-hand side of
(10) is strictly increasing. This uniquely determines the equilibrium cutoff md, because
lim
md→0
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2) dG(m) = 0 and lim
md→∞
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2) dG(m) =∞.
A.3. Market size, the equilibrium cutoff, and the mass of entrants. Differentiating
(10) and using the Leibniz integral rule, we readily obtain
∂md
∂L
= −αF
(
md
)2
eL2
[∫ md
0
m2
(
W−2 − 1)W ′dG(m)]−1 < 0,
because W ′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Differentiating (12) with respect to L yields
∂NE
∂L
=
F (NE)2
L2
{
1− eL
3
αF (md)2
[∫ md
0
m2W ′dG(m)
]
∂md
∂L
}
> 0,
where the sign comes from ∂md/∂L < 0 as established in the foregoing.
A.4. Existence and uniqueness in the two-region case. Under our assumptions on trade
costs, the RHS of (30) is non-negative if and only if ω < ω < ω, where ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (τ22/τ12)k/(k+1)
and ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (τ21/τ11)k/(k+1). Furthermore, the RHS is strictly decreasing in ω ∈ (ω, ω)
with limω→ω+ RHS = ∞ and limω→ω−RHS = 0. The LHS of (30) is, on the contrary, strictly
increasing in ω ∈ (0,∞). Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium ω∗ ∈ (ω, ω).
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A.5. Market size, trade frictions, and wages. (i) First, ω∗ is increasing in L1/L2 as an
increase in L1/L2 raises the RHS of (30) without affecting the LHS. This implies that if the two
regions have equal technological possibilities (ρ = 1) and face symmetric trade costs (τ12 = τ21
and τ11 = τ22), the larger region has the higher relative wage.
(ii) Higher internal trade costs in one region reduce the relative wage of that region, because
∂(RHS)
∂τ11
< 0 iff ω∗ > ω and
∂(RHS)
∂τ22
> 0 iff ω∗ < ω.
(iii) Better access to the foreign market raises the domestic relative wage, whereas better access
to the domestic market reduces the domestic relative wage because
∂(RHS)
∂τ12
< 0 iff ω∗ < ω and
∂(RHS)
∂τ21
> 0 iff ω∗ > ω.
(iv) Assuming that τ12 = τ21 = τ and that τ11 = τ22 = t, one can verify that
∂(RHS)
∂τ
= −kρt
k
τ k+1
L1
L2
ρ2 − ω2(k+1)
[ωk+1 − ρ(t/τ)k]2

>
=
<
 0 for

ω < ρ
1
k+1 < ω∗ < ω
ω < ω∗ = ρ
1
k+1 < ω
ω < ω∗ < ρ
1
k+1 < ω
 . (35)
Note that when regions are of equal size, but have different upper bounds (ρ > 1), the first case
of (35) applies since ω∗ > ρ1/(k+1) in equilibrium. To see this, evaluate (30) at ω = ρ1/(k+1) and
recall that τ21 = τ12 = τ and L1 = L2. The LHS is equal to ρ
k/(k+1), which falls short of the
RHS given by ρ (since ρ > 1 and k ≥ 1). Since the LHS is increasing and the RHS is decreasing,
it must be that ω∗ > ρ1/(k+1). Hence, lower trade costs reduce the relative wage of the more
productive region. Furthermore, when regions have the same upper bounds but different sizes
(L1 > L2), we obtain ω
∗ > ρk/(k+1) = 1, so that the first case of (35) applies again. (v) Assuming
that τ12 = τ21 = τ and that τ11 = τ22 = t and using (29), one can verify that(
md1
md2
)k+1
=
L2
ρL1
[
1− ρ ( t
τ
)k
ω−(k+1)
1− ρ−1 ( t
τ
)k
ωk+1
]
. (36)
Furthermore, (30) can be rewritten as
ωk =
ρL1
L2
[
1− ρ−1 ( t
τ
)k
ωk+1
1− ρ ( t
τ
)k
ω−(k+1)
]
ρ
ωk+1
⇐⇒ ω2k+1 = ρ
(
md2
md1
)k+1
,
where we use (36) to obtain the equivalence. Now assume that ρ = 1 and that L1 > L2. Then,
we know from (i) that ω > 1, which implies md1 < m
d
2. It is then readily verified from (31) that
the larger region has the higher utility. (vi) Let τ12 = τ21 = τ and τ11 = τ22 = t. Imposing
symmetry between the two regions, i.e., ρ = 1 and ω = 1, and using (29), one can verify that
(mdr)
k+1 = µmaxr /{Lrt[1 + (t/τ)k]}, thus implying that the cutoff decreases as bilateral trade
barriers fall. It is then readily verified from (31) that the utility increases as bilateral trade
barriers fall.
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Section B: Integrals involving the Lambert W function
To derive closed-form solutions for various expressions throughout the paper we need to compute
integrals involving the Lambert W function. This can be done by using the change in variables
suggested by Corless et al. (1996, p.341). Let
z ≡ W
(
e
m
I
)
, so that e
m
I
= zez, where I = mdr ,m
x
rs,
where subscript r can be dropped in the closed economy. The change in variables then yields
dm = (1 + z)ez−1Idz, with the new integration bounds given by 0 and 1. Under our assumption
of a Pareto distribution for productivity draws, the change in variables allows to rewrite integrals
in simplified form.
B.1. First, consider the following expression, which appears when integrating firms’ outputs:∫ I
0
m
[
1−W
(
e
m
I
)]
dGr(m) = κ1 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ1 ≡ ke−(k+1)
∫ 1
0
(1 − z2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the
shape parameter k.
B.2. Second, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ operating profits:∫ I
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
I
)−1
+W
(
e
m
I
)
− 2
]
dGr(m) = κ2 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ2 ≡ ke−(k+1)
∫ 1
0
(1 + z) (z−1 + z − 2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is also a constant term which solely
depends on the shape parameter k.
B.3. Finally, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ revenues:∫ I
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
I
)−1
− 1
]
dGr(m) = κ3 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ3 ≡ ke−(1+k)
∫ 1
0
(z−1 − z) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the
shape parameter k. Using the expressions for κ1 and κ2, one can verify that κ3 = κ1 + κ2.
Section C: Equilibrium in the open economy
In this Section we restate the open economy equilibrium conditions of Section 3 using the Lam-
bert W function.
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C.1. Using (18), the labor market clearing condition can be rewritten as follows:
NEr
{
1
α
∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
1−W
(
e
m
mxrs
)]
dGr(m) + Fr
}
= Lr. (37)
C.2. Plugging (18) into (20), zero expected profits require that
1
α
∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxrs
)−1
+W
(
e
m
mxrs
)
− 2
]
dGr(m) = Fr. (38)
As in the closed economy case, the zero expected profit condition depends solely on the cutoffs
mxrs and is independent of the mass of entrants.
C.3. Finally, the trade balance condition is given by
NEr wr
∑
s 6=r
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxrs
)−1
− 1
]
dGr(m)
= Lr
∑
s 6=r
NEs τsrws
∫ mxsr
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxsr
)−1
− 1
]
dGs(m). (39)
Applying the region-specific Pareto distributions Gr(m) = (m/m
max
r )
k to (37)–(39) yields, after
some algebra and using the results of Section B, expressions (22)–(24) given in the main text.
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